AN ENCOUNTER WITH A HOOKER CREATES A DATING RELATIONSHIP TRIGGERING THE NJ DOMESTIVE VIOLENCE ACT

The New Jersey Appellate Division rendered a decision earlier today that an encounter (saying that loosely) with a call girl affords that call girl protection under the New Jersey Domestic Violence Act. The caption of the case was J.S. v. J.F. In essence, the Appellate Division in J.S. v. J.F. gave broad interpretation to the term, "dating relationship' thus providing a call girl the same types of legal protections as persons involved in an actual dating relationship, marital relationships, etc.

NEW JERSEY MUNICIPAL COURTS RESOLVE DWI CASES IN 60 DAYS!

Many of my clients facing a DWI charge in the State of New Jersey have repeatedly asked, "why are they required to appear before a Municipal Court Judge within 2-4 days of being issued a summons for driving under the influence in violation of N.J.S.A 39:4-50. In some cases, the DWI defendant is required to appear before a Municipal Court Judge within hours of being released from police detention on a NJ DWI summons. My answer is always the same-the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a directive advising all New Jersey Municipal Court Judges to resolve or dispose of DWI cases within 60 days of the alleged violation date. If your interested, the comprehensive directive reads as follows:

Directive on Statewide DWI Backlog Reduction
Directive #1-84 July 26, 1984
Issued by: Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz
For the last several years, issues relating to driving while intoxicated have been
in the forefront of public attention in New Jersey and nationwide. The New Jersey
Legislature has enacted a number of bills to increase statutory minimum penalties, and
to provide financial support for increased enforcement and sanctions. The Executive
Branch has pursued programs of increased enforcement of these laws with vigor.
I recognize that a number of conditions, in addition to increased filings, have
combined to cause a backlog, including challenges to the reliability of breathalyzers.
However, our duty is to dispose of cases swiftly and fairly, within reasonable time
standards. We must and will meet that challenge.
The Supreme Court has, therefore, decided as a matter of policy that complaints
charging offenses under N.J.S.A. 39-4:50, Operation or Allowing Operation by Persons
Under the Influence of Liquor or Drugs and N.J.S.A. 39:4-50a. or [sic], Refusal to
Submit to Chemical Test, must be disposed of within 60 days of filing. This is consistent
with the standard suggested by all judges who attended the Annual Conference of
Municipal Court Judges in October 1983. It shall apply to all but exceptional cases.
However, I want to emphasize that DWI backlog reduction must not be pursued
at the expense of other court efforts especially the resolution of more serious disorderly
persons complaints. Therefore, special sessions may be needed in many courts.
I want to note that the 60 day standard for DWI cases, established in this
Directive, is a goal. Therefore, it does not replace the traditional guidelines established
through case law for dismissals based on lack of a speedy trial. You should now
consider and begin to implement management strategies designed to meet the 60 day
standard for new DWI cases. Techniques such as arraignment and scheduling soon
after complaint filing, expedited identification of defense counsel, pre-trial conferences
and scheduled trial dates within 45 days should be considered in this context.
I cannot overemphasize the importance of this effort. Elected officials of both the
legislative and executive branches of government have taken major steps to address
the DWI problem. It is incumbent on all segments of the judiciary to address this issue
with equal vigor. I would like to congratulate those courts that have succeeded in
keeping their DWI caseloads current. For those courts that have DWI backlogs,
immediate attention to this problem is crucial to New Jersey's statewide efforts to
effectively adjudicate DWI cases.
Memorandum
Issued by: Robert D. Lipscher
Administrative Director
We will initiate a longer-term planning activity to reduce on-going delays in DWI
cases, maintaining the standard of 60 days from complaint to disposition in all but
exceptional cases. Your involvement as judge, or where applicable, presiding judge of
your municipal court will be of paramount importance.
1. DWI Backlog Reduction Goal
The goal of the DWI Backlog Reduction program is to reduce the number
of backlogged cases to tolerable levels. Backlog is defined as the number
of DWI cases which are already older than the goal, here 60 days. The 60
day goal set by the Supreme Court is expected to be met in all but
"exceptional" cases. It is estimated that approximately 10% of all cases
are exceptional, having problems which will require more than 60 days for
disposition. Therefore, a portion of your inventory of DWI cases may
properly be over 60 days old. However, this should not represent more
than 10% of the cases under 60 days old. Accordingly, your backlog
reduction goal is to eliminate all DWI cases over 60 days old, with the
exception of the number of cases representing 10% of your DWI inventory
under 60 days old. Courts with less than 10 DWI cases total should not
have more than one DWI case in backlog. If you are not currently clearing
your calendar on DWI (that is, your monthly filings are exceeding
dispositions), then your backlog will be increasing during the course of the
year to the extent of the difference.
2. Backlog Reduction Strategies
As the Chief Justice EDITOR=S NOTEd in the Directive, DWI backlogs are
not to be reduced at the expense of other caseloads. While his desire is
to maximize local initiative in developing methods for backlog reduction
plans, it is strongly urged that the following alternatives be seriously
considered.
a. Case Conferences
Many municipalities have already successfully used calendar calls
as a management tool to identify the nature of their DWI backlog.
This allows for a discussion with each defendant and his or her
attorney as to the needs of each case. If appointed counsel is
required, then that process can be commenced. A municipal court
prosecutor should be in attendance at all case conference
sessions. Discovery needs can also be identified, and the judge
should prepare an order scheduling future events in the case. This
procedure can also identify those cases where the defendant does
not intend to request a trial, allowing guilty pleas to be entered at an
early stage in the proceedings.
b. Special Sessions
Consistent with the requirement not to delay other non-DWI
calendars, it is very likely that, even after case conferences have
been held, special sessions will need to be scheduled to dispose of
your DWI backlog. Again, this alternative has been
successfully utilized in a growing number of municipalities.
Reported experience is that between five and ten cases can be
disposed of at such sessions, averaging seven
cases (although some reports have been as high as 20 cases).
Therefore, if you divide the total excessive backlog estimated at the
bottom of the accompanying memorandum by seven, you will have
a reasonable estimate of the number of special sessions that will be
needed during the eight month period allotted for backlog reduction.
Of course, you should closely monitor DWI filings and dispositions
during the next eight months and adjust the number of special
sessions accordingly.
c. Adjournments
Courts should develop a written and firm policy disfavoring the
adjournment of DWI cases. This policy should be communicated to
attorneys when cases are scheduled.
3. Funding of Special Sessions
In order to conduct special sessions for clearing the DWI backlog, it may
be necessary to identify additional funds. Two major sources of funding
are available for this purpose.
a. State Assistance for Special Sessions Funding. N.J.S.A. 26:2B-35
establishes a Municipal Court Administration Reimbursement Fund
which provides moneys pursuant to the statutory formula for use by
municipal courts in disposing of DWI inventories. The procedure
for applying for these funds is to be found in subsection b(1) of
N.J.S.A. 26:2B-35.
b. Emergency Municipal Appropriations. Such funds will be approved
under an emergency resolution. Enclosed is a letter from the
Director of Local Government Services, as well as an application
form for approval of such appropriations.
4. Calendar Conflict Avoidance
In order to minimize conflict with Superior Court schedules, special
sessions should be scheduled for evenings or Saturdays during the time
of the project. If such sessions must be scheduled during weekdays,
approval must be obtained from the Assignment Judge. A list of all
attorneys involved in these matters should be submitted to the Assignment
Judge so that conflicts with Superior Court cases can be considered.
5. Municipal Public Defenders and Prosecutors
If possible, a municipal public defender should be appointed for indigents
for the purpose of the special sessions, and reimbursement will be allowed
under the grant funds. The municipal prosecutor should examine his or
her needs and the contract under which he or she is employed to
determine whether additional resources are needed for such sessions.
Some courts have reported that special sessions run most smoothly when
a second prosecutor is available to prepare the next case. This should be
considered.
6. Municipal Court Administrators
If the number of special sessions required is large, then you may have to
seek additional resources for your administrator. Perhaps an
administrator from a non-backlogged neighboring municipality can assist
on an overtime basis in preparing for or handling such special sessions.
Your vicinage Trial Court Administrator's office will be familiar with the
experience of special sessions in other municipal courts and will be
available to assist in your planning.
7. Acting Judges
If an acting judge is needed to preside over special sessions, you should
consult with your Trial Court Administrator's office regarding procedures to
obtain an acting judge. Municipal governing bodies may appoint acting
judges under N.J.S.A. 2A:8-5.2 for a term of up to one year. It would be
most practical to use an experienced sitting municipal court judge for such
special sessions, although it is obviously within the discretion of the
governing body to make the appointment. Forms for approval of acting
judge requests can be obtained from your Assignment Judge.
8. Expert and Other Witnesses
I am informed that cases with relatively lower blood-alcohol content
readings sometimes utilize expert witnesses to ascertain alcohol burn-off
and absorption rates, especially when such computations can be used to
question whether the defendant was at or above .10 BAC at the time of
operation. Your plan may provide for the scheduling of such cases
specially to accommodate the needs of such expert witnesses. It may be
further coordinated on a broader basis. This should be discussed when
you meet with the Assignment Judge. As well, in planning special
sessions, it will be obviously useful to coordinate them in a manner
consistent with the needs and availability of local or state police witnesses,
and these needs should be examined and discussed in your local
meetings. These techniques should be employed at this time in order to
meet the standard of 60 days from arrest to disposition for DWI cases so
that we can examine their effectiveness. Your immediate attention to the
DWI backlog in your court is crucial to our statewide efforts to address this
very important problem.
EDITOR=S NOTE
This directive is in two parts consisting of a policy statement by the Chief Justice, followed by a
memorandum implementing the plan by the Administrative Director.
The original directive had contemplated the development of a plan by each municipal court judge
for the disposal of existing driving while intoxicated ("DWI") backlog by May 1, 1985. All references in the
directive and its enclosures to the development of a plan or program have been deleted. Two of the
enclosures, a form for transmitting backlog status as of June 1, 1984 and a reduction plan format, have
also been removed.
The directive has been edited to delete the 1983 statistics in the first paragraph and all references
to the plans in the remaining seven paragraphs. Only the second, third, and eighth paragraphs and
portions of the first and seventh paragraphs have been retained, setting forth the 60 day standard for
disposing of DWI cases.
The supplement to the directive, originally intended to provide material for the development of the
plans, has been edited to delete all reference to those plans, but to retain the proposals for backlog
strategies and for funding which are still valid. The original paragraph 1 suggesting the formation of local
planning committees has been deleted and the remaining numbered paragraphs have been redesignated.
Paragraph 3 on funding has been changed. The Federal Highway Safety grant is no longer in
operation and all reference to it has been deleted. The costs for special sessions based on 1984
computations have also been deleted from that section. In its place two new sources of funding have
been added. N.J.S.A. 26:2B-35 enacted in 1983 and operative February 9, 1984 establishes the
"Municipal Court Administration Reimbursement Fund" and allocates one third of the moneys dedicated
for enforcement in the Alcohol Education, Rehabilitation and Enforcement Fund of the State Department
of Health for use in reducing DWI inventories. In addition, legislation signed on December 23, 1990, (P.L.
1990, c.95 and 96) removes the municipal court budget from the municipal CAP law. These two new
sources of funding have been added.
The third source, emergency appropriations, is still available, and the application form, list of
documents required with the emergency resolution and letter, dated October 7, 1983 from the Director,
Division of Local Government Services are still valid.
In paragraph 6, references to the "municipal court clerk" have been changed to "municipal court
administrator" in accordance with the statutory change in title. (P.L. 1991, c.98, which amends N.J.S.A.
2A:8-13, et. seq.)
In paragraph 7 N.J.S.A. 2A:8-5.2 has been substituted for P.L. 1983, c.430 and the description of
this legislation as "recent legislation" has been deleted. The language has been amended to render it
gender neutral.
Chapter 7 of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey governs practice in
municipal courts. This chapter was substantially revised in 1997 and users of this compilation should
consult the revised chapter for any changes that may affect these directives

The New Jersey Supreme Court properly interpreted N.J.S. 39:4-97.2 (unsfe driving)

As indicated in my prior blog post, N.J.S. 39:4-97.2 permits a person charged with a moving violation (bearing motor vehicle points) to have that moving violation, if recommended by the prosecutor and approved by the Judge, amended to 39:4-97.2 (commonly known as Unsafe Driving). Unsafe Driving is a zero motor vehicle and/or insurance eligibility point downgrade only for two offenses within a five year period. Recently, the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, interpreting the Unsafe Driving Statute, improperly interpreted the statute to attach four motor vehicle points on a third offense regardless of how much time has past since the person's previous violation. My opinion has always been and apparently the New Jersey Supreme Court agrees, that the New Jersey Motor Vehicle's Commission interpretation of the statue regarding the forgiveness component was improper. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Hina K. Patel v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (A-86-08), decided November 10, 2009, held that under N.J.S.A 39:4-97.2(e), the exemption provision for assessing motor vehicle penalty points for an unsafe driving offense that occurs more than five years after "the prior offense, " "the prior offense" refers only to the most recent preceding offense based on both a plain reading of the statute and a review of the legislative history. In dicta, the Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that the forgiveness component of the statute is denied to third time offenders even if 5 years has past from a previous offense.

ARE MOTOR VEHICLE POINTS ASSESSED IF YOUR CONVICTED FOR TALKING ON YOUR CELLPHONE WHILE OPERATING A MOTORVEHICLE

Recently my clients have been inquiring on whether or not the charge of using a cellphone while operating a motor vehicle carries motor vehicle or insurance eligibility points. My answer is it depends. Let me explain, if you go to court and amend a moving violation to 39:4-97.3 (the cellphone charge) then you may be assessed motor vehicle and/or insurance points, only if, you had pled guilty to unsafe driving (39;4-97.2) on two prior occasions. Otherwise, there are no motor vehicle points in pleading guilty to using a cellphone while operating a motor vehicle. The statute reads as follows (pay particular attention to the last paragraph of said statute):

39:4-97.3. Use of hands-free and hand-held wireless communication devices while driving; when permitted; penalty

a. The use of a wireless telephone or electronic communication device by an operator of a moving motor vehicle on a public road or highway shall be unlawful except when the telephone is a hands-free wireless telephone or the electronic communication device is used hands-free, provided that its placement does not interfere with the operation of federally required safety equipment and the operator exercises a high degree of caution in the operation of the motor vehicle. For the purposes of this section, an “electronic communication device” shall not include an amateur radio.

b. The operator of a motor vehicle may use a hand-held wireless telephone while driving with one hand on the steering wheel only if:

(1) The operator has reason to fear for his life or safety, or believes that a criminal act may be perpetrated against himself or another person; or

(2) The operator is using the telephone to report to appropriate authorities a fire, a traffic accident, a serious road hazard or medical or hazardous materials emergency, or to report the operator of another motor vehicle who is driving in a reckless, careless or otherwise unsafe manner or who appears to be driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. A hand-held wireless telephone user's telephone records or the testimony or written statements from appropriate authorities receiving such calls shall be deemed sufficient evidence of the existence of all lawful calls made under this paragraph.

As used in this act, “hands-free wireless telephone” means a mobile telephone that has an internal feature or function, or that is equipped with an attachment or addition, whether or not permanently part of such mobile telephone, by which a user engages in a conversation without the use of either hand; provided, however, this definition shall not preclude the use of either hand to activate, deactivate, or initiate a function of the telephone.

“Use” of a wireless telephone or electronic communication device shall include, but not be limited to, talking or listening to another person on the telephone, text messaging, or sending an electronic message via the wireless telephone or electronic communication device.

c. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c. 198).

d. A person who violates this section shall be fined $100 .

e. No motor vehicle points or automobile insurance eligibility points pursuant to section 26 of P.L.1990, c. 8 (C.17:33B-14) shall be assessed for this offense.

f. The Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission shall develop and undertake a program to notify and inform the public as to the provisions of this act.

g. Whenever this section is used as an alternative offense in a plea agreement to any other offense in Title 39 of the Revised Statutes that would result in the assessment of motor vehicle points, the penalty shall be the same as the penalty for a violation of section 1 of P.L.2000, c. 75 (C.39:4-97.2), including the surcharge imposed pursuant to subsection f. of that section, and a conviction under this section shall be considered a conviction under section 1 of P.L.2000, c. 75 (C.39:4-97.2) for the purpose of determining subsequent enhanced penalties under that section.

State v. Golotta (discussed and decision posted)

The New Jersey Supreme Court held that an uncorroborated tip to the police about an intoxicated driver can constitute sufficient reasonable suspicion (provide the requisite probable cause) for the police to stop a motor vehicle without actually observing the vehicle break any traffic laws. The opinion is as follows:

Justice VERNIERO delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this search-and-seizure case, a cell-phone user telephoned a 9-1-1 operator to report that a particular motor vehicle was being driven erratically on a public road. The question presented is whether that call and the information that it imparted provided a constitutional basis for the police to stop the identified vehicle. Given the significant risk of death or serious injury to the public and to the vehicle's driver implicated by such a call, and in view of the other factors discussed below, we hold that the answer to that question is yes.

I.

These are the pertinent facts as developed at the suppression hearing before the municipal court. On November 5, 2000, at about 9:30 p.m., two officers of the Peapack-Gladstone police department, each driving a separate police cruiser, received a message from a communications center in Somerville. The center's dispatcher relayed to the officers that the center had received a call from “a citizen informant” using a cell phone. According to the one officer who testified, the citizen called to report that a person in a certain vehicle was driving erratically. The officer was informed that the vehicle was “all over the road” and “out of control. It was weaving back and forth.”

The caller also described the vehicle as a blue pickup truck with the license plate number, VM-407B, and indicated that it was traveling northbound on Route 206. At the suppression hearing the officer was asked whether the dispatcher disclosed the caller's name or “whether or not a name was obtained[.]” The officer answered that “[a] name was not obtained.” The officer further indicated “that [the caller] did not want to file a charge or a *210 complaint ... [a]nd did not want to be involved. [The caller] merely wanted to report that this [erratic driving] was occurring.”

When the officer received that information, he was traveling westbound on Pottersville Road close to where the road intersects with Route 206. The officer explained, “I approached 206 at the crest of the hill. At the traffic light, as I approached, I witnessed ... a blue pick-up truck pass in front of me.” (The officer later indicated that he had not observed “any movements of the vehicle whatsoever.” The officer made that statement in response to the question, “Can you describe what the vehicle was doing?” Viewing the testimony in context, we understand it to mean that the officer did not see any erratic movements, but did observe the vehicle pass in front of him.) He and the other officer, who was traveling northbound on 206, quickly moved behind the vehicle, and they “initiated the stop at the same time.”

The vehicle matched the description given by the caller, except that the last letter of the license plate number was “V” rather than “B.” As already indicated, because the testifying officer immediately initiated the stop once he had located the vehicle, he did not notice whether it was being driven improperly. The officer stated that he “was only behind the vehicle for a matter of four to five seconds before [he and the other officer] effected ... the stop.”

Subsequent to the stop, the driver, later identified as defendant Salvatore Golotta, submitted to a breathalyzer test, and was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Defendant moved before the municipal court to suppress the breathalyzer results. He argued that, by not observing the alleged erratic driving, the officer had lacked sufficient suspicion to stop the vehicle and, as a result, any evidence gathered after that juncture was inadmissible. Given that position, the suppression hearing focused solely on whether the police were justified in stopping the vehicle and not on any aspect of their conduct that followed the stop. The municipal court denied defendant's motion. Thereafter, defendant entered a guilty plea to the DWI offense *211 conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.

Defendant appealed to the Law Division. Following its de novo review of the record, the trial court noted that the officer had stopped defendant's vehicle on the basis of the anonymous tip and without himself observing any suspicious conduct. Consistent with its view of the relevant case law, the trial court held that there was an insufficient basis contained in the record to justify the stop and, therefore, that the breathalyzer results must be suppressed.

After granting the State's motion for leave to appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed in a reported opinion. State v. Golotta, 354 N.J.Super. 477, 808 A.2d 135 (2002). The panel agreed with the Law Division that the police had not adequately corroborated or verified the anonymous tip and, accordingly, the officers had not formed “a reasonable articulable suspicion of quasi-criminal activity to justify the stop of defendant.” Id. at 483, 808 A.2d at 138. We granted the State's motion for leave to appeal, 176 N.J. 70, 819 A.2d 1186 (2003), and also granted amicus curiae status to the Attorney General.

II.

Prior to oral argument before this Court, the Attorney General moved to submit the fact that the informant in this case was not anonymous but in reality had given his name to the 9-1-1 operator at the time of the call. As support, the Attorney General has provided a written abstract generated by a computer-aided dispatch system that purportedly contains the precise date and time of the call, the caller's name, and other relevant information. Defendant strongly objects to that submission, contending that we should not “re-write the [t]rial [r]ecord” at this belated juncture in the proceedings.

We agree with defendant insofar as the caller's identity is concerned. We recently explained that, as a general rule within a suppression context, “the State on appeal cannot rely on factual *212 testimony or other proof that was not submitted as part of the lower court's record.” State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 14, 833 A.2d 1087, 1091 (2003). It would be inconsistent with appellate practice for us to accept the proffered information here, especially in view of the fact that the State had ample opportunity two years ago to present it at the proper forum, namely, at the original suppression hearing. Thus, we will continue to treat and analyze this case as if the informant had not offered or identified his name to the police.

The Attorney General's brief and motion papers contain other information that generally describes the 9-1-1 system that is utilized in Somerset County and elsewhere in the State. We accept that generic information, which is akin to our taking judicial notice of it, for the limited purpose of assisting the Court in understanding how the 9-1-1 system operates in this setting. See id. at 17, 833 A.2d at 1093 (instructing in search-and-seizure case that appellate courts “can infer or take judicial notice of certain facts in appropriate circumstances”); State v. Garthe, 145 N.J. 1, 12, 678 A.2d 153, 158 (1996) (taking judicial notice of similarity of procedures for testing breathalyzer machines and recording results); Biunno, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 2 on N.J.R.E. 202(b) (2002) (outlining other examples in which courts have taken judicial notice of certain facts in criminal cases).

III.

A.

Having addressed the Attorney General's motion, we now turn to the governing legal principles. The parties do not dispute that, in responding to the dispatched information, the officers subjected defendant to an investigatory stop (sometimes called an investigative detention). Consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its analog, Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, “a police officer is *213 justified in stopping a motor vehicle when he has an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the driver has committed a motor vehicle offense.” State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470, 724 A.2d 234, 238 (1999) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 673 (1979).

The “[r]easonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop is a lower standard than the probable cause necessary to sustain an arrest.” State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356, 788 A.2d 746 (2002). The standard requires “ ‘some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.’ ” State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511, 816 A.2d 153, 159 (2003) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)). The test is “highly fact sensitive and, therefore, not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Ibid. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). For analytical purposes in this case, a stop founded on a suspected motor vehicle violation essentially is governed by the same case law used to evaluate a stop based on suspected criminal or quasi-criminal activity.

An informant's tip is a factor to be considered when evaluating whether an investigatory stop is justified. In that regard, we recently summarized the relevant principles followed by the United States Supreme Court and by this Court:

An anonymous tip, standing alone, is rarely sufficient to establish a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2415, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 308 (1990). The United States Supreme Court has warned that “the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is ‘by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983)). That Court also has instructed that an informant's “veracity,” “reliability,” and “basis of knowledge” are “relevant in determining the value of his report.” Id. at 328, 110 S.Ct. at 2415, 110 L.Ed.2d at 308 (citation and quotation marks omitted). To justify action **364 based on an anonymous tip, the police in the typical case must verify that the tip is reliable by some independent corroborative effort. Id. at 329-30, 110 S.Ct. at 2415-16, 110 L.Ed.2d at 309.

Generally, “if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required *214 if the tip were more reliable.” Id. at 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d at 309. Stated differently, courts have found no constitutional violation when there has been “independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informer's predictions[.]” Id. at 332, 110 S.Ct. at 2417, 110 L.Ed.2d at 310. The analysis in any given case turns ultimately on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d at 309.

[ State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 127-28, 796 A.2d 857 (2002).]

Against the backdrop of those general rules, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has addressed specifically whether an anonymous tip reporting erratic driving provides a constitutional basis to justify a motor vehicle stop. In United States v. Wheat, a motorist using a cell phone called 9-1-1 to report that “a tan-and-cream colored Nissan Stanza or ‘something like that,’ whose license plate began with the letters W-O-C, was being driven erratically in the northbound lane of Highway 169.” 278 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 850, 123 S.Ct. 194, 154 L.Ed.2d 81 (2002).

The caller further stated that the Nissan was “passing on the wrong side of the road, cutting off other cars, and otherwise being driven as if by a ‘complete maniac.’ The 9-1-1 operator did not ask the caller to identify himself. Police dispatchers relayed the caller's tip to patrolling officers.” Ibid. Shortly after receiving the dispatch, an officer “observed a tan Nissan Maxima whose license plate began with the letters W-O-C, stopped in the northbound lane of Highway 169[.]” Ibid. The Nissan then made a right turn, and the officer “stopped it immediately, without having observed any incidents of erratic driving.” Id. at 724-25.

The Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the anonymous call could not give rise to a reasonable suspicion sufficient to warrant the stop because the police never witnessed any traffic violation in progress or about to occur. Id. at 726, 729. The court compared the case before it with existing Supreme Court decisions that discuss, in other contexts, the degree to which the police might test an informant's credibility by reviewing the predictive information contained in the tip itself. The court noted:

*215 A careful reading of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests that this emphasis on the predictive aspects of an anonymous tip may be less applicable to tips purporting to describe contemporaneous, readily observable criminal actions, as in the case of erratic driving witnessed by another motorist.... Unlike with clandestine crimes such as possessory offenses, including those involving drugs or guns, where corroboration of the predictive elements of a tip may be the only means of ascertaining the informant's basis of knowledge, in erratic driving cases the basis of the tipster's knowledge is likely to be apparent. Almost always, it comes from his eyewitness observations, and there is no need to verify that he possesses inside information.

The court also outlined certain informational requirements that must be satisfied to uphold the stop. The court stated that the caller must

**365 provide a sufficient quantity of information, such as the make and model of the vehicle, its license plate numbers, its location and bearing, and similar innocent details, so that the officer, and the court, may be certain that the vehicle stopped is the same as the one identified by the caller.

The court further emphasized that the “tip must also contain a sufficient quantity of information to support an inference that the tipster had witnessed an actual traffic violation that compels an immediate stop.” Id. at 732.

In addition, the court noted that situations involving erratic driving present the public with dangers not found in other situations, such as when a tipster identifies a person suspected of carrying a concealed weapon:

The rationale for allowing less rigorous corroboration of tips alleging erratic driving is that the imminent danger present in this context is substantially greater (and more difficult to thwart by less intrusive means) than the danger posed by a person in possession of a concealed handgun. Therefore, the moving violation or violations alleged must suggest real exigency. An allegation of erratic driving will generally pass this test since it strongly suggests that the driver is operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs and is unable to control his vehicle.

The court acknowledged that, on occasion, “even a supposedly contemporaneous account of erratic driving could be a complete work of fiction, created by some malicious prankster to cause trouble for another motorist.” Id. at 735. On balance, however, with respect to accounts that otherwise seem credible under the totality of circumstances, the court concluded that “the risk of false tips is slight compared to the risk of not allowing the police immediately to conduct an investigatory stop[.]” Ibid.

The Wheat court also cited state courts in other jurisdictions that have ruled similarly. Id. at 729-30. One such case is State v. Boyea, 171 Vt. 401, 765 A.2d 862 (2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 917, 121 S.Ct. 2524, 150 L.Ed.2d 696 (2001). There, an anonymous caller described a “blue-purple Volkswagen Jetta with New York plates, traveling south on I-89 in between Exits 10 and 11, operating erratically.” Id. at 863. Based on that tip and without independently observing any problems, a patrolling officer located and stopped the vehicle in question. Ibid.

In upholding the validity of the stop, the Supreme Court of Vermont evaluated the reasonableness of the government's action in light of the “gravity of the risk of harm.” Id. at 868 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The court indicated that it had “consistently recognized the serious threat posed to public safety by the frequency with which individuals, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, continue to operate motor vehicles on the public highways.” Ibid. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the court concluded that “[b]alancing the public's interest in safety against the relatively minimal intrusion posed by a brief investigative detention, the scale of justice in this case must favor the stop; a reasonable officer could not have pursued any other prudent course.” Ibid. (internal citation omitted).

The Supreme Court of Iowa reached the same result on similar facts in State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (2001). In that case, an anonymous caller informed the police that he suspected that an intoxicated motorist was driving a certain automobile **366 in the median of a road. The caller described the vehicle's make, model, and license plate number. Id. at 625-26. The arresting officer located the car and stopped it solely on the basis of the call. Id. at 626. The officer “did not personally observe any behavior that would *217 [have] generate[d] reasonable suspicion” for a motor vehicle stop. Ibid.

In upholding the police conduct, the court observed that the information provided by the caller “did not concern concealed criminal activity, but rather illegality open to public observation.” Id. at 627. The court further explained that “the call disclosed the means by which the information was obtained, i.e., observation of the crime in progress[.]” Id. at 629. That, in essence, gave the caller a level of credibility analogous to a citizen informant serving as an eyewitness to an ongoing crime. Ibid. The court also observed that a tip involving the imminent danger posed by intoxicated drivers “might call for a relaxed threshold of reliability,” and that as compared to a pat-down search of one's person, a motor vehicle stop involves a lesser intrusion on privacy. Id. at 630.

In yet another recent case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld an investigatory stop of a vehicle based on an anonymous tip alleging erratic driving. In State v. Rutzinski, a police officer on routine patrol “overheard a police dispatch[er] requesting a squad to respond” to a specific location. 241 Wis.2d 729, 623 N.W.2d 516, 519 (2001). The reason for the dispatch was that an “unidentified motorist calling from a cell phone [had] reported that he or she was observing a black pickup truck weaving within its lane, varying its speed from too fast to too slow, and ‘tailgating.’ ” Ibid. Shortly thereafter, a second dispatch was issued, reporting “that the [caller] was still on the phone” indicating that the black pickup truck had traveled to a different location. Ibid. An officer stopped the vehicle without independent corroboration of the alleged erratic driving. Ibid.

In ruling that the police conduct was proper, the court relied on the fact that the caller “was making personal observations of [the defendant's] contemporaneous actions.” Id. at 526. As a result, the caller's information carried a level of reliability not found in other settings. Moreover, like the other courts that have held similarly, the Rutzinski court recognized that the tip in question *218 suggested that the defendant “posed an imminent threat to the public's safety.” Ibid. The court emphasized that the “tremendous potential danger presented by drunk drivers” was a significant factor to be considered when weighing the totality of the circumstances for purposes of determining the validity of the stop. Ibid.

B.

We agree with those courts that have reduced the degree of corroboration necessary to uphold a stop of a motorist suspected of erratic driving in these circumstances. Similar to the reasoning of those courts, our rationale is threefold. First, by its nature, a call placed and processed via the 9-1-1 system carries enhanced reliability not found in other contexts. Second, the conduct at issue is the temporary stop of a motor vehicle based on reasonable suspicion, not the more intrusive search of its contents or arrest of its driver, which would be governed by different rules. Third, an intoxicated or erratic driver poses a significant risk of death or injury to himself and to the public and, as such, that factor is substantial when evaluating the reasonableness of the stop itself.

As for the first factor, the Legislature has enacted a series of statutes designed to implement an enhanced 9-1-1 system throughout New Jersey. **367 N.J.S.A. 52:17C-1 to -16. Most significant for our purposes here, the statutes require telephone companies to furnish public-safety agencies with specific information in respect of any telephone used to initiate a 9-1-1 call. The law provides:

Whenever possible and practicable, telephone companies shall forward to jurisdictional public safety answering points via enhanced 9-1-1 network features, the telephone number and street address of any telephone used to place a 9-1-1 call. Subscriber information provided in accordance with this section shall be used only for the purpose of responding to emergency calls or for the investigation of false or intentionally misleading reports of incidents requiring emergency service.

In a related provision, the statute limits the liability of telephone carriers when they furnish the required information about their *219 customers, including non-published telephone numbers, as mandated under the act. N.J.S.A. 52:17C-10c.

Our statutes also criminalize the false reporting of emergencies and explicitly include within their ambit calls placed to 9-1-1. Generally, it is a crime for a person knowingly to report or make a false warning of an emergency that is likely to cause public inconvenience or alarm, or to transmit such false alarms “to or within any organization, official or volunteer, for dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property.” N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3a. Specifically in respect of the 9-1-1 system, “[a] person is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree if the person knowingly places a call to a 9-1-1 emergency telephone system without purpose of reporting the need for 9-1-1 service.” N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3e.

In view of those provisions, we agree with the State that a 9-1-1 call carries a fair degree of reliability inasmuch as “it is hard to conceive that a person would place himself or herself at risk of a criminal charge by making such a call.” The police maintain records of 9-1-1 calls not only for the purpose of responding to emergency situations but to investigate false or intentionally misleading reports. We acknowledge that it is possible to retain one's anonymity by placing a 9-1-1 call from a telephone booth or by using certain wireless technology. (According to the Attorney General, some types of cell phones are susceptible to “caller identification,” whereas other types currently are not.) On balance, we are satisfied that in an expanding number of cases the 9-1-1 system provides the police with enough information so that users of that system are not truly anonymous even when they fail to identify themselves by name.

[6] Accordingly, the State stands on firm constitutional ground when it treats the anonymous 9-1-1 caller in the same fashion as it would an identified citizen informant who alerts the police to an emergent situation. We previously have explained the difference between tips obtained by criminal as opposed to citizen informants:

*220 Information given by the criminal informant is usually given in exchange for some “concession, payment or simply out of revenge against the subject,” whereas an ordinary citizen acts with “an intent to aid the police in law enforcement because of his concern for society or for his own safety. He does not expect any gain or concession in exchange for his information.”

[ Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 391, 744 A.2d 1146, 1155 (2000) (internal citation omitted).]

Analogous to a report offered by a citizen informant, the information imparted by a **368 9-1-1 caller should not be “viewed with the same degree of suspicion that applies to a tip by a confidential informant.” Id. at 390, 744 A.2d at 1155.

[7] The second factor in our analysis is the nature of the intrusion at issue. We reaffirm the enhanced protections that we have accorded citizens under the New Jersey Constitution, particularly in respect of motor vehicles. See, e.g., State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 670, 751 A.2d 92, 99 (2000) (declining to apply reduced federal standard when evaluating automobile exception to warrant requirement); State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 647, 790 A.2d 903, 912 (establishing State standard for obtaining consent to search automobile, beyond valid motor vehicle stop), modified, 174 N.J. 351, 806 A.2d 798 (2002). Without diminishing those protections, the fact remains that in the hierarchy of interests, “[t]here is a lesser expectation of privacy in one's automobile, and in one's office, than in one's home.” State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608, 625, 775 A.2d 1273, 1283 (2001) (internal citations omitted).

From a constitutional standpoint, that lesser privacy interest and the nature of the intrusion (an investigatory stop, not a full-blown search, prompted by allegations of erratic driving) are relevant in assessing the reasonableness of the government's conduct. If those variables were absent or existed under different conditions, our analysis might differ. For example, an anonymous call to 9-1-1 reporting that an individual possessed illegal narcotics in his car or home would not, absent other factors, lend itself to the kind of reduced corroboration permitted in this case. In short, we do not intend our analysis to apply blindly to other search-and-seizure questions that ordinarily would turn on principles or considerations not implicated here.

*221 [8] The final factor warranting a reduced degree of corroboration is the reality that intoxicated drivers pose a significant risk to themselves and to the public. See State v. Tischio, 107 N.J. 504, 519, 527 A.2d 388, 396 (1987) (describing such drivers as “moving time bombs”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), appeal dismissed, 484 U.S. 1038, 108 S.Ct. 768, 98 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). “The combination of an undue ingestion of alcohol and the resultant mishandling of automobiles causes awesome carnage on our highways [.]” State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 429, 775 A.2d 495, 505 (2001) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). That reality imposes a duty on law enforcement officers to take appropriate steps within constitutional and statutory boundaries to maintain the safety of New Jersey's roads. State v. Greeley, 178 N.J. 38, 49, 834 A.2d 1016, 1023 (2003) (recognizing “continuing duty of the police to safeguard the public” from “dangers” imposed by intoxicated persons and also recognizing “risks posed by an intoxicated person to himself”).

Because the Constitution “is not a suicide pact[,]” Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160, 83 S.Ct. 554, 563, 9 L.Ed.2d 644, 656 (1963), it permits courts to consider exigency and public safety when evaluating the reasonableness of police conduct, State v. DeLuca, 168 N.J. 626, 634, 775 A.2d 1284, 1288 (2001). In a different context, those same factors help justify the authority conferred on the government to implement suspicionless sobriety stops to check motorists for possible intoxication. State v. Hester, 245 N.J.Super. 75, 81, 584 A.2d 256, 259 (App.Div.1990). The risk to life and safety posed by an intoxicated or erratic driver convinces us that it is reasonable and, therefore, constitutional for the police to act on information furnished by an anonymous 9-1-1 caller without the level of corroboration that traditionally would be necessary to uphold such action.

We do not, however, suggest that any information imparted by a 9-1-1 caller will suffice. The information must convey an unmistakable sense that the caller has witnessed an ongoing offense that implicates a risk of imminent death or serious *222 injury to a particular person such as a vehicle's driver or to the public at large. The caller also must place the call close in time to his first-hand observations. When a caller bears witness to such an offense and quickly reports it by using the 9-1-1 system, those factors contribute to his reliability in a manner that relieves the police of the verification requirements normally associated with an anonymous tip.

Nor do we suggest that no corroboration or predictive information is necessary in this setting. We adopt the formulation of other courts that the 9-1-1 caller must provide a sufficient quantity of information, such as an adequate description of the vehicle, its location and bearing, or “similar innocent details, so that the officer, and the court, may be certain that the vehicle stopped is the same as the one identified by the caller.” Wheat, supra, 278 F.3d at 731. We are satisfied that such details, when verified or observed by the officer conducting the stop and viewed within the context of the factors described above, provide an adequate basis under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, paragraph 7 to justify the government's conduc

With those tenets in mind, we turn to the case at hand. At the suppression hearing conducted by the municipal court, the officer testified that the dispatched information concerning defendant's vehicle had been transmitted to him “through a communication[s] center in Somerville.” Although the officer did not explicitly describe that unit as the county's 9-1-1 call center, we are able to infer that fact or take judicial notice of it consistent with the information submitted by the Attorney General. See Nishina, supra, 175 N.J. at 507, 816 A.2d 153 (taking notice of fact that school identified at suppression hearing served students through fourth grade although no testimony specifically established that fact).

Specifically, as we understand the Attorney General's submission, when a caller dials 9-1-1 the call is switched automatically to *223 a unit such as the communications center in Somerville, which serves as Somerset County's 9-1-1 call center. The police maintain written abstracts and tape recordings of each call, and readily can retrieve or use those records for investigatory purposes. See N.J.A.C. 17:24-2.1, -2.4 (setting forth rules governing creation and retention of 9-1-1 records). Thus, the first factor necessary to employ a reduced degree of corroboration in respect of the caller's information is present here, namely, that the caller utilized the 9-1-1 system to initiate the police conduct.

As for the second and third factors, the intrusion involved a stop of defendant's motor vehicle on a public road, and the officer was informed that the vehicle was “weaving back and forth,” and was “out of control.” Those factors implicate the reduced privacy interests and safety concerns more fully described above. Moreover, the caller's information unmistakably conveyed a sense that he personally had witnessed an offense in progress and had reported it close in time to his first-hand observations. (The fact that the police located the moving vehicle still on Route 206 supports an inference that the caller reported the vehicle's whereabouts soon after his original observations.)

**370 The remaining question is whether the caller described the vehicle with sufficient specificity to permit the officers reasonably to conclude that defendant's truck was, in fact, the suspected vehicle. The short answer is yes. The caller indicated that the vehicle was a blue pickup truck with a license plate number VM-407B, “heading northbound on Route 206 into Peapack.” The caller therefore described four separate facts, (1) the vehicle's color, (2) the type of vehicle, (3) the vehicle's license plate number, and (4) the vehicle's approximate location or direction, all of which matched facts relating to defendant's vehicle, except for a minor discrepancy in the plate number.

In that regard, the testifying officer stated that he had observed “a blue pick-up truck pass in front of him” in the direction and on the road indicated by the caller. At some juncture the officer noticed that the vehicle's license plate number “was off one last letter [from the caller's description].” That the plate's last letter might have been a “V” as opposed to a “B” is constitutionally insignificant when considered along with the other information supplied by the caller. It would have been reasonable for the officers to assume that the two like-sounding letters were confused in transmission. In any event, that lone error does not diminish our finding that the caller imparted sufficient information via the 9-1-1 system to furnish a reasonable basis for the police to effect a constitutional stop under the totality of circumstances.

In arguing a contrary conclusion, defendant cites a decision of the United States Supreme Court, Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), and a decision of this Court, Rodriguez, supra, 172 N.J. 117, 796 A.2d 857. In J.L., supra, “an anonymous caller reported to the [police] that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.” 529 U.S. at 268, 120 S.Ct. at 1377, 146 L.Ed.2d at 258-59. The call apparently was not recorded and there was “nothing known about the informant” or the location of his call. Ibid. When the police responded they found a person who matched the description “just hanging out” at the bus stop. Ibid. Based solely on the anonymous tip, one of the officers approached the defendant, frisked him, and seized a gun from his pocket. Ibid.

In invalidating the search, the Supreme Court concluded that the information furnished by the informant was insufficient to justify the police encounter. Id. at 271, 120 S.Ct. at 1379, 146 L.Ed.2d at 260-61. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Ginsburg explained: “All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about [the defendant].” Ibid. Thus, the tip lacked even a “moderate indicia of reliability” necessary to sustain the government's action. Ibid.

Justice Ginsburg, however, was careful in suggesting that “the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify *225 a search even without a showing of reliability.” Id. at 273, 120 S.Ct. at 1380, 146 L.Ed.2d at 262. She amplified that suggestion by cautioning that the Court was not holding “that public safety officials in quarters where the reasonable expectation of Fourth Amendment privacy is diminished, such as airports, and schools, cannot conduct protective searches on the basis of information insufficient to justify searches elsewhere.” Id. at 274, 120 S.Ct. at 1380, 146 L.Ed.2d at 262 (internal citations omitted).

In a thoughtful concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy also indicated that future conditions might allow for a court to uphold police conduct based on an anonymous tip under circumstances similar to those found in a 9-1-1 case. He explained:

If an informant places his anonymity at risk, a court can consider this factor in weighing the reliability of the tip.

Instant caller identification is widely available to police, and, if anonymous tips are proving unreliable and distracting to police, squad cars can be sent within seconds to the location of the telephone used by the informant. Voice recording of telephone tips might, in appropriate cases, be used by police to locate the caller. It is unlawful to make false reports to the police, and the ability of the police to trace the identity of anonymous telephone informants may be a factor which lends reliability to what, years earlier, might have been considered unreliable anonymous tips.

These matters, of course, must await discussion in other cases, where the issues are presented by the record.

[ Id. at 276, 120 S.Ct. at 1381, 146 L.Ed.2d at 263-64 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).]

This, it seems to us, is the kind of case envisioned by the J.L. Court in which the investigatory stop is sustainable based on the content of the caller's tip and its urgent manner of transmission. Unlike the informant in J.L., the caller here “place[d] his anonymity at risk” by virtue of using the 9-1-1 system. In J.L. there was no record made of the anonymous informant's call to the police, whereas telephone companies in New Jersey are required, whenever possible, to furnish certain information about 9-1-1 callers to the appropriate public-safety agencies. Those records, combined with voice recordings of such calls, provide the police *226 with an ability to trace the identity of the caller in a manner that enhances his reliability.

Moreover, as already noted, the narrow question is whether there was a sufficient basis to stop the vehicle, not whether grounds existed for the police to search its contents or arrest its driver. Those more intrusive forms of conduct are governed by existing case law, the validity of which remains undisturbed by our holding in this case. See, e.g., Cooke, supra, 163 N.J. at 670, 751 A.2d at 99 (establishing State rules governing warrantless automobile searches); Carty, supra, 170 N.J. at 647, 790 A.2d at 912 (same in respect of automobile consent searches); State v. Pavao, 239 N.J.Super. 206, 209, 570 A.2d 1285, 1286-87 (App.Div.) (discussing standards for requesting motorist to submit to breathalyzer test and effecting valid DWI arrest), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 138, 584 A.2d 211, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 898, 111 S.Ct. 251, 112 L.Ed.2d 209 (1990).

Perhaps most important, here the officer was confronted with a risk of imminent danger to defendant and to the public, a circumstance that allowed the officer less corroboration time than if the tip had alleged that an individual standing passively on a street corner was carrying a concealed weapon. Although unlawfully concealing a weapon poses a public-safety risk, driving a pickup truck erratically on a highway such as Route 206 is a more immediate threat. In such urgent situations, a police officer need not wait for corroboration that might be fatal to an innocent member of the public or to the driver himself. Courts in other jurisdictions have distinguished J.L. using the same or a similar rationale. E.g., Wheat, supra, 278 F.3d at 729-36; Boyea, supra, 765 A.2d at 866-67; Walshire, supra, 634 N.W.2d at 627-30; Rutzinski, supra, 623 N.W.2d at 525-27.

In the same vein, it bears repeating that the J.L. Court itself suggested a public-safety exception to its holding. Justice Ginsburg instructed: “We do not say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the *227 police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.” J.L., supra, 529 U.S. at 273-74, 120 S.Ct. at 1380, 146 L.Ed.2d at 262. We find the bomb example to be particularly apt because, as already noted in this opinion, this Court previously has described intoxicated motorists as “moving time bombs.” Tischio, supra, 107 N.J. at 519, 527 A.2d at 396 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Although we analyze this case in terms of “reduced” or “less rigorous” corroboration than might apply in other settings, our decision can just as readily be described as doing no more than accepting a level of corroboration commensurate with the level of threat implicated by the tip at issue. In other words, we do not in this case reduce the degree of corroboration necessary to ensure the tip's reliability. Rather, we consider the citizen caller to have sufficient inherent reliability given the nature and content of the 9-1-1 communication so that an independent corroborative effort, beyond confirmation of the vehicle's description, is not constitutionally required.

Our analysis likewise is consistent with Rodriguez, supra, 172 N.J. 117, 796 A.2d 857. In that case, an anonymous informant alleged that two men traveling by bus were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. Id. at 121-22, 796 A.2d at 859-60. The police observed two men, including the defendant, matching the description provided by the informant. Id. at 122, 796 A.2d at 859. The officers thereafter subjected the defendant to an investigative detention by quickly moving him from the public street to a patrol office contained within the bus terminal. Id. at 128, 796 A.2d at 863. The State sought to uphold the detention solely on the basis of the anonymous tip. Id. at 129-30, 796 A.2d at 864-64.

Relying on J.L., we ruled in favor of the defendant, concluding that his detention could not be justified based on what the police knew at the time of the encounter. Id. at 131, 796 A.2d at 865. However, just as this case differs from J.L., it also differs from Rodriguez. In Rodriguez, there was no immediate safety risk either to the public in general or to the officers specifically. In that respect, we noted that the record in that case contained “no basis to conclude that a concern for officer safety justified the movement of [the] defendant from the street to the patrol office.” Id. at 128, 796 A.2d at 863. By comparison, the purpose of the stop in the case before us was to protect defendant and the public from a threat of death or serious injury occasioned by defendant's suspected condition.

We acknowledge that a few state courts have viewed these issues differently. See, e.g., McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1078 (Wyo.1999) (concluding in three-to-two decision that tip concerning erratic driving did not create adequate basis for investigatory stop). However, in addressing a question that turns ultimately on the reasonableness of the government's conduct, we evaluate that conduct in view of local conditions. In so doing, we note that automobiles and other vehicles densely populate New Jersey's roads. See New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission, About MVC, at http:// www.state.nj.us/mvc/about_mvc. html (last updated Oct. 28, 2003) (indicating that there are nearly six million licensed motorists in this State). Against that backdrop, the police acted reasonably in stopping defendant's vehicle based on the caller's information, the method by which they had received it, and the concern for safety that remains at the heart of this case.

In sum, as a general rule, “[a]n anonymous tip, standing alone, is rarely sufficient to establish a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.” Rodriguez, supra, 172 N.J. at 127, 796 A.2d at 862. This case, however, falls within that narrow band of cases in which a 9-1-1 call carries sufficient reliability to sustain a motor vehicle stop when the purpose of that stop is to prevent imminent harm to the vehicle's driver or to the public. We are persuaded that the J.L. decision contemplates such a holding, which also is consistent with this Court's prior jurisprudence, including Rodriguez. For those reasons, we conclude that the stop of defendant's vehicle was valid under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed.